social media

A Supreme Court Judgement deems the offence of causing annoyance in the ICT Act to be “hopelessly vague”

05/06/2021 By christina Leave a Comment

On 27 May 2021, Supreme Court judges D. Chan Kan Cheong and K.D. Gunesh-Balaghee delivered their judgement in the case of SEEGUM J v THE STATE OF MAURITIUS 2021 SCJ 162.

Seegum had been prosecuted before the Intermediate Court on 5 counts for the offence of “using an information and communication service for the purpose of causing annoyance”, in breach of sections 46(h)(ii) and 47 of the ACT Act. Two counts were dismissed and the trial had proceeded on three counts all related to “wilfully and unlawfully using an information and communication service for the purpose of causing annoyance to another person” on a Facebook forum under Section 46(h)(ii) of the ICTA, which read as follows at the time of the alledged offence:

“46. Offences Any person who -(…)
(h) uses an information and communication service, including telecommunication service, –
(ii) for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience or needless anxiety to any person;
(…)
shall commit an offence.”

Seegum had been found guilty by the Intermediate Court and fined to Rs 15,000 for each of the 3 counts (total of Rs 45,000). He appealed against the judgement on several grounds, one of them being that “that section 46(h)(ii) of the ICTA breaches section 10(4) of the Constitution”. That section of the Constitution states that:

(4) No person shall be held to be guilty of a criminal offence on account of any act or omission that did not, at the time it took place, constitute such an offence, and no penalty shall be imposed for any criminal offence that is severer in degree or description than the maximum penalty that might have imposed for that offence at the time when it was committed.

Seegum’s counsel argued that “causing annoyance” suffers from vagueness in the formulation of the ICT Act and causes uncertainty. It does not allow the ordinary citizen to determine which conduct may be considered as causing annoyance and whether a particular conduct will fall within the purview of section 46(h)(ii) of the ICT Act.

In their statement, the two Supreme Court judges upheld this argument, recalling that a number of past cases cases have allowed courts (in Mauritius and elsewhere) to reaffirm the well established principle that criminal laws must be certain and formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. They write that: “for a criminal law to pass the test of constitutionality under section 10(4), it must be so worded that it allows the ordinary citizen to determine what constitutes an offence and what acts and omissions will render him liable to prosecution.”

The judges proceed to compare the initial version of section 46(h)(ii) of the ICTA to similar provisions of the law in the UK and India, namely section 66A of the Information Technology Act 2000 of India and section 127(2) of the UK Communications Act, 2003. They find a marked difference between the Mauritian provision and the English and Indian provisions. In both the UK and in India, there should be evidence that the offender knew that his/her message was based on information he/she knew to be false or made persistent use of electronic means to send the message. The elements of falsity and persistent use “in the English and Indian law make the offence more objectively ascertainable by the Courts and by the citizens.”

Section 46(h)(ii) certainly offers no clear distinction between a conduct which is innocuously annoying and one which is criminally reprehensible. It lacks precision and clarity and is “hopelessly vague”. Leaving it up entirely to the Courts to determine which conduct is criminal on a case to case basis, with no discernible objective criteria, is giving a too wide discretion to the Courts and creating uncertainty in the law.

The judgement thus basically deemed that the version of article 46(h)(ii) of ICT Act to be unconstitutional.

The judges do specify that they do not make any pronouncement about the constitutionality of the redrafted version of the section (done in 2018). But this will undoubtedly create a precedent for any new cases being judged under the redrafted section of the ICT Act and it further weakens the justifications for the ICTA proposal for regulation using a technical toolset to intercept all internet traffic in Mauritius, a proposal which was itself predicated on that very section.

It is useful to recall that the new version of Section 46(h)(ii) of the ICTA now reads as follows:

(ii) which is likely to cause or causes annoyance, humiliation, inconvenience, distress or anxiety to that person; (the changes are in bold )

It seems to me that this new formulation is even more subjective than the former version which was the basis for the Supreme Court case. The 2018 updated formulation creates even more uncertainty and imprecision in defining the nature of the offence as it introduces the phrase “which is likely to cause…”, meaning that the impact of the offence may be hypothetical, rather than real. It also adds new terms: “humiliation” and “distress”, which are not well-defined either.

I may be wrong but such a judgement from no less than the Supreme Court further diminishes the likelihood for the amendments proposed in the ICTA Consultation to be given the go ahead. And this is good news!

My final submission to the ICTA on its proposed amendments to the ICT Act

19/05/2021 By christina 2 Comments

In this blogpost, you will find the link to my final submission to the ICTA on its proposed amendments to the ICT Act. In the last section of my paper, I include my answers (reproduced below) to the specific questions of the ICTA in its Consultation Paper.

Click here to access the full text of the analytical paper

Click here to access the PDF format of the Analytical Paper

Summary of questions being released for public consultation

14.1 What are your views on the present approach of self-regulation of social networks by social media administrators themselves where they decide to remove an online content or not based on their own usage policy and irrespective of your domestic law?

Countries around the world face issues concerning circulation of posts which are potentially in breach of their domestic laws on social media platforms. There is, at present, no fully satisfactory response which is proposed or effectively deployed in any democratic country. Only non-democratic countries have recourse to drastic measures aiming to block and/or intercept all of their own citizens’ online communications and social media traffic in an attempt to regulate the same. As a democratic country, Mauritius cannot use methods which would be more suitable for non-democratic regimes.

It is true that the content being circulated online which either targets or is created by Mauritian citizens on social media may be in breach of domestic laws. However, an objective assessment of the extent of such illicit content being circulated needs to be conducted to determine the extent of abuse and/or misuse as already specified in the above paper,

It should also be recalled that social media platforms offer various levels of privacy, meaning that one may categorise the online communication sphere created by these into multiple sub-categories, which can tentatively be broadly listed as follows:

Online national public sphere created by public personalities (prominent members of society such as politicians, leaders of big organisations, community and religious leaders, opinion leaders, etc.) and organisations (whether public or private bodies) who decide to publish their posts on the full “public mode” level. Their content becomes accessible to anyone without the need to be directly connected as “friends” or “friends of friends”. They generally have a large number of followers/friends and their posts can be shared, thereby enabling them to become viral.
Targeted public circles created by specific individuals and bodies who wish to communicate within a semi-restricted sphere, upon invitation.
Private circles whereby an individual or entity communicates only with their friends and whose posts cannot be shared outside of the network of friends.

There are obviously more levels of control which are generally available on some social media platforms in between those three broad categories. Suffice to say that the first level (online national public sphere) is the one which should command the most attention, followed by the second level (targeted public circles) whereas the third level (private circles) may be considered the equivalent of private conversations between private individuals.

Individuals and entities who have large follower bases in the online national public sphere and targeted public circles are the ones who should be more subject to scrutiny as they have the potential for virality and their speech is tantamount to public speech, which may be evaluated against prevailing domestic laws.

As it is, the responsibility for regulating content rests primarily on the social media platforms themselves, the most popular of which are based overseas, thus not directly subjected to domestic laws. These platforms use their own terms of use or community standards to evaluate content (1) when prompted by other users who flag potential issues or (2) when their internal algorithms detect highly sensitive content requiring intervention by the platform.

Intense debates have taken place after the occurrence of major incidents linked to social media accounts of public figures such as former US President Donald Trump. The latter’s account was shut down on platforms such as Twitter and Facebook after the Capitol invasion in January 2021 when he lost elections. Despite multiple posts which contained fake news and racist comments during his presidency, he was only banned from social media platforms when he lost the last elections, thus sparking debates about whether all major public figures around the world would henceforth be liable to similar treatment by the platforms. This was one of the most prominent cases entrusted by Facebook to its own Oversight Board for review. The Facebook Oversight Board published its ruling on 5th May 2021 and upheld the decision but requested that Facebook review the decision within the next six months and also develop clear, necessary, and proportionate policies that promote public safety and respect freedom of expression.

Thus, it can be deduced that platforms are not monolithic organisations and they are prone to debates both on the internal and external fronts. All parties involved still fray with the delicate issue of regulation and remain open to reviews and possible disruption of their moderation policies and mechanisms.

These mechanisms remain unsatisfactory and will probably never ever be satisfactory due to the complexity involved whereby the very same platforms can be used:

to mobilise for good causes or incite bad mass behaviour,
to communicate on different levels such as one-to-one, one-to-few, few-to-few, one-to-many or many-to-many.

Regulating social media is not an easy task and a simple one-size-fits-all solution will simply not work without creating bigger prejudices.

14.2 Do you think that the damage caused by the excesses and abuses of social networks to social cohesion warrants a different approach from the self-regulatory regime presently being enforced by social media administrators themselves?

There is not enough data which has been made available about the damage caused by the excesses and abuses of social networks to social cohesion in Mauritius to be able to formulate an informed reply to this question. The data remains impressionistic rather than scientific. For instance, how many such cases have there been over the last years and months that have not been detected and tackled through the current investigation and legal system? What have been the trends in the number of such cases? What is the exact breakdown? What have been the actions taken by authorities? In what way have they been insufficient? To date, we have no knowledge of massive excesses that have created havoc in the social tissue of our country. There have been no major riots nor major ethnic conflicts which have been reported by the Mauritian police over the past few days that we know of.

14.3 What are your views on the overall proposed operational framework in terms of the
• National Digital Ethics Committee (NDEC)
• Enforcement Division
which is intended to bring more clarity to section 18 (m) of the ICT Act, where the ICTA is mandated to take steps to regulate or curtail the harmful and illegal content on the Internet and other information and communication services.

Please refer to comments made in the paper submitted above.

14.4 What are your views on the proposed legal amendments to the ICT Act to give legal sanctity and enforcement power to the NDEC?

This is a risky proposal as the composition of such a committee will inevitably be reviewed each time a new political party or coalition gains majority in the National Assembly to constitute government. Such powers should rest only within the justice system to ensure impartiality and independence from political power games.

14.5 What are your views on the proposed modus operandi of the NDEC?
There is scant information provided in the consultation paper about the modus operandi of the proposed NDEC. It merely stipulates that “it is proposed that the Chairperson and members of the NDEC be independent, and persons of high calibre and good repute.”

There are no indications whatsoever about the following:

Number of members
Composition of the committee (profiles of members)
Process for nomination of members
Duration of mandate for members
Process for evaluating complaints
Existence of a review or appeal systems (as opposed to the justice system where the different appeal levels are clearly defined by law)
Proposed stages of penalty or fines (as opposed to the justice system where maximum sentences and fines are clearly defined by law)

14.6 What are your suggestions on the safeguard measures to be placed for the NDEC?
No specific safeguard measures for the NDEC have been proposed in the consultation paper. The paper merely stipulates that:
“Before start of operations, the NDEC will also be tasked to come up with sufficient and effective safeguards to be published in order to ensure complete operational transparency and avoidance of any abusive use and misuse of this operational framework.”
First and foremost, the nature of the committee itself is problematic and one cannot expect the committee to define its own safeguards, which would be the equivalent of a watchdog being asked to watch over itself.

14.7 What are your views on the use of the technical toolset, especially with respect to its privacy and confidentiality implications when enforcing the mandatory need to decrypt social media traffic?
As stated by major browsers namely Google and Mozilla in their joint submission, the proposed technical toolset is very dangerous as it would undermine the privacy of Mauritian citizens and put them at risk of attacks by third parties if it does work. Browser makers may decide to block the system. The proxy server may be clogged down by the volume of traffic to be handled and may even be targeted by cyber attacks. As a result, access to the internet may be slowed down or even paralysed for all in Mauritius. This would not only impact citizens but also foreigners communicating and transacting with people based in Mauritius as well as local and international corporate entities.

This toolset can set us back completely as an aspiring tech hub. We may lose business and partnership opportunities, incoming FDI, inbound tourists, and existing foreign companies may prefer to move their branches or headquarters to other countries.

If this toolset is implemented, Mauritius will also undoubtedly be downgraded in international indices such as Freedom House, Reporters Without Borders, the ITU ICT Development Index, the Global Innovation Index or even the Ease of Doing Business index, inter alia. The repercussions for the economy may be far-reaching. Many international organisations have already expressed their concern and opposed the proposed amendments to the ICT Act.

14.8 Can you propose an alternative technical toolset of a less intrusive nature which will enable the proposed operational framework to operate in an expeditious, autonomous and independent manner from the need to request technical data from social media administrators?

No technical toolset can be proposed at the local level. Solutions should preferably be sought in consultation with the social media platforms and the legal and judiciary should be better equipped to deal with complaints related to social media.

In the first case, diplomatic negotiations should be leveraged with regional organisations such as the African Union, SADC and COMESA or international partnerships such as with fellow Commonwealth and Francophone allies and SIDS (Small Island Developing States).

When reinforcing our legal capacity to tackle infringements to domestic laws on social media, the investigative teams within the police force also need to be provided with regular training as technological products and services evolve quickly.

More importantly, if abuse and misuse of social media in breach of domestic laws are to be tackled in a sustainable manner, it is very important to invest in nation-wide as well as targeted campaigns for:

digital literacy,
media and information literacy,
civic education.

14.9 Should the Courts be empowered to impose sentences (which include banning use of social media) on persons convicted of offences relating to misuse of social media tools?

The responsibility of adjudicating sentences should indeed remain within the judiciary system of Courts as learned magistrates and judges are trained professionals for adjudicating sentences.

The investigative teams within police departments concerned should also be reinforced through capacity building.

Summary of key points in the body of my Analytical Paper

Premise

It is a positive point that the ICTA has published this as a Consultation Paper and extended deadline for submission of comments.
ICTA states that social media plaforms take too much time to respond to their requests, that community standards are not as strict as nor necessarily compliant with our domestic laws, and that they may not be able to moderate content adequately as they do not understand our Mauritian Creole language. For the ICTA, a “minority of individuals or organised groups” are at fault and “The issue at hand is when these abuses, even though perpetrated by few individuals/groups, go viral, the damage created is very far reaching.”
Before proposing any solution, the exact nature of an existing problem needs to be examined in detail to answer the question “How big is the problem of misuse and abuse of social media really in the country that warrants such far-reaching measures as those being proposed by the ICTA in its consultation paper?”
This should include detailed information about the “very far reaching damage” created. The consultation paper does include a table listing the number of incidents reported to the MAUCORS but lacks information about the current investigation process, actions taken by authorities, whether dealt with locally by law or reported to platforms, and results obtained and final outcomes achieved.

The ICTA proposal:

Setting up of a National Digital Ethics Committee (NDEC) as the decision-making body to: “investigate on illegal and harmful content on its own or through interaction with other stakeholders already involved in national security, crime investigation, detection and prevention or through complaints received;”
Creation of a Technical Enforcement Unit to enforce the technical measures as directed by the NDEC.
Use of a technical toolset whereby internet users in Mauritius will have to use a local proxy server as intermediary and will be asked to install a self-signed digital certificate allowing the ICTA server to be accepted as intermediary by the browser or the app, thereby bypassing the https protocol.

Analysis

The adjective “harmful” needs to be defined clearly to understand what is allowed and what is not allowed. Otherwise, there is a risk of potential abuse and misuse by authorities and any parties involved in the mechanism. Assuming that the intention of the current appointees of the ICTA with this proposal is genuinely to create a safe online public sphere in Mauritius and to work for the greater good rather than for vested interests, there is no guarantee that subsequent appointees would follow suit. Petty political games may ensue.
The adjective “illegal” is clearer as this relates to the laws of the country, which are enacted by parliament, interpreted by courts of justice and implemented by policy-makers.
The main issue with this proposal is a potential conflict with Section 12 of the Constitution as highlighted in the paper itself. The Constitution states that there can be no interference in our communications except with our consent and except for specific provisions involving public defence, safety, order, morality and health, reputation, privacy, courts authority, technical administration of telecoms and civil service restrictions. BUT, the provisions should be “justifiably reasonable in a democratic society” and the proposed amendments to the ICT Act do not seem “justifiably reasonable in a democratic society“.
The proposal is tantamount to blanket surveillance on the citizens of Mauritius without judicial oversight. ALL citizens’ communication would be interfered with in a blanket manner. The proportionality test needs to be applied: Does this pass the balance of risks/benefits? This proposal seems to contradict the philosophy of the Data Protection Act which aims to protect citizens’ private data and which was adopted in 2017 (and modelled on the EU GDPR).
No other democratic state is using such a system as the one proposed by the ICTA. There is a high probability that Mauritius will tumble down in world freedom rankings.
In all the democratic states cited in the consultation paper, the responsibility for moderation and removal of illegal content remains vested with the social media platforms as these state agencies never endow themselves with any technical capacity to interfere, intercept and remove any content on social media in comparison with the Mauritian ICTA proposal.
The mechanism for intercepting, decrypting and re-encrypting social media traffic would require enormous technical capabilities given the enormous amounts of data (photos, videos, livestreams, etc.) generated daily. It is also very much a moving target. Any social media network may change some implementation details which might make the system ineffective. Anyone can also bypass the system just by using a Virtual Private Network (VPN).

Potential alternatives to the proposed amendments

The last question in the consultation paper asks citizens if they think that local courts of justice should be empowered to “impose sentences (which include banning use of social media) on persons convicted of offences relating to misuse of social media tools”. This may indeed be explored.
Preventive measures such as education, sensitisation and digital literacy remain crucial to create a more civic space online.
We could also explore the use of our diplomatic connections at the regional level to enter into negotiation with the social media platforms in order to improve their responsiveness to requests from local authorities (eg. AU, SADC).

Conclusion

The public consultation formula is a positive process. In the same spirit, it is expected that there be a public report about inputs received (as announced by the ICTA) and how these inputs are tackled by the ICTA and any other authority involved in the process.
On the basis of information provided so far, the present proposed amendments do not seem reasonable at all in terms of the proportionality of the measures with respect to the problem to be tackled. Rather, they represent a significant threat to our democratic setup and may have far-reaching repercussions not only on the social and political but also on the economic fronts.

The proposed amendments to the ICT Act to regulate social media in democratic Mauritius entail the risk of creating a surveillance state

22/04/2021 By christina Leave a Comment

On 14 April 2021, the Information and Communication Technologies Authority (ICTA) released a Consultation Paper on proposed amendments to the ICT Act for regulating the use and addressing the abuse and misuse of Social Media in Mauritius. In a nutshell, the paper makes a proposal to amend the law so that all internet communication would have to pass through a centralised proxy server managed by the agency and citizens will have to install a digital self-signed certificate on their devices to allow the server to access, decrypt, segregate social media traffic for analysis for investigative purposes. The technical toolset would be managed by an Enforcement Unit within the ICTA and there would be a National Digital Ethics Committee to decide on how to deal with “illegal and harmful content”.

There are numerous issues with this proposal. The most salient one being that the mechanism would make Mauritius a blanket surveillance state, which is incompatible with the concept of democracy. In fact, no other democracy in the world uses such a blanket system to intercept citizens’ communication in order to regulate social media. Below is a more detailed analysis of the content.

– What is the context for the proposed amendments?
– Preliminary comment about the context
– What are those proposed amendments to the ICT Act?
– Comment about the philosophy underlying the proposal
– What does the Constitution say?
– What are other democratic states doing or trying to do?
– Other key questions posed by the proposed amendments
– What are potential alternatives to the proposed amendments?
– Conclusion

What is the context for the proposed amendments?

There is a perceived need for regulation of social media in Mauritius. The stated objective is to combat illegal and harmful content (and comment) in a way that is not dependent on international social media companies. These platforms are deemed to be not sufficiently responsive to requests from the authorities in terms of:

time taken to respond,
community standards which are not as strict as our domestic laws, and
the Creole language which the platform moderators do not understand.

The paper states that a “minority of individuals or organised groups” are at fault and that “The issue at hand is when these abuses, even though perpetrated by few individuals/groups, go viral, the damage created is very far reaching.”

Preliminary comment about the context

A first comment is that a list of concrete examples is needed here to gauge the extent of the problem at the national level. The list should include detailed information about the “very far reaching damage” created. The consultation paper does include a table listing the number of incidents reported to the Mauritian Cybercrime Online Reporting System (MAUCORS).

We would however need more details on the following (inter alia):

the investigation process for the incidents reported,
the actions taken by the authorities in all of these cases,
whether these incidents were dealt with locally by law or reported to the social media platforms,
the results obtained.
An in-depth analysis of the above would be needed. This would enable a more objective evaluation of the proportionality of the proposed mechanism with respect to the extent of the problem to be addressed. In a nutshell, the question is: How big is the problem of misuse and abuse of social media really in the country that warrants such far-reaching measures?

What are those proposed amendments to the ICT Act?

ICTA is proposing the creation of:

a National Digital Ethics Committee (NDEC) as the decision-making body on the contents. The key mandate of the NDEC would be to:

investigate on illegal and harmful content on its own or through interaction with other stakeholders already involved in national security, crime investigation, detection and prevention or through complaints received;

a Technical Enforcement Unit to enforce the technical measures as directed by the NDEC.
a technical toolset to be deployed whereby internet users in Mauritius will have to use a local proxy server as intermediary and will be asked to install a self-signed digital certificate allowing them to be accepted as intermediary by the browser or the app, thereby bypassing the https protocol. The stated objective is to allow the proxy server to:

segregate traffic to and from social media sites,
decrypt such information
analyse and store data for investigations purposes

Comment about the philosophy underlying the proposal

The adjective “harmful” should be defined clearly with a list of all types of content and the criteria which will be used to classify such content as harmful. Otherwise, this will inevitably lead to questions in the public’s mind about what is allowed and what is not allowed. In other words, the “rules of the game” should be clearly spelt out in advance.
There is also an inherent risk of potential abuse and misuse by authorities and parties involved in the mechanism if the term “harmful” is not clearly defined. An important matter such as this cannot be open to interpretation, bearing in mind that the principle of potential “alternance”of parties in power is still valid in Mauritius and that there is always a risk of petty power games as a result.
The adjective “illegal” is clearer as this relates to the laws of the country, which are enacted by parliament, interpreted by courts of justice and implemented by policy-makers.
More importantly, the main issue with this proposal is a potential conflict with section 12 of the Constitution as highlighted in the paper itself.

What does the Constitution say?

As a reminder, Section 12 of the Constitution of Mauritius states that:

12. Protection of freedom of expression

(1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without interference, and freedom from interference with his correspondence.

(2) Nothing contained in or done under the authority of any law shall be held to be inconsistent with or in contravention of this section to the extent that the law in question makes provision— (a) in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health;

(b) for the purpose of protecting the reputations, rights and freedoms of other persons or the private lives of persons concerned in legal proceedings, preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, maintaining the authority and independence of the Courts, or regulating the technical administration or the technical
operation of telephony, telegraphy, posts, wireless broadcasting, television, public exhibitions or public entertainments; or

(c) for the imposition of restrictions upon public officers, except so far as that provision or, as the case may be, the thing done under its authority is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society

This section thus states that there can be no interference in our communications except with our consent and except for specific provisions involving public defence, safety, order, morality and health, reputation, privacy, courts authority, technical administration of telecoms and civil service restrictions. BUT, the last line puts everything in perspective as the provisions should be “justifiably reasonable in a democratic society” .

Unfortunately, the proposed amendments to the ICT Act do not seem “justifiably reasonable in a democratic society“.

The proposal is tantamount to blanket surveillance on the citizens of Mauritius without judicial oversight. No warrant would be needed to spy on specific individuals. ALL citizens’ communication would be interfered with in a blanket manner. The proportionality test is here crucial to determine whether such a surveillance system is really warranted in a democratic society like ours. Does this pass the balance of risks/benefits? Fundamentally, this proposal seems to contradict the philosophy of the Data Protection Act which aims to protect citizens’ private data and which was adopted in 2017 (and modelled on the EU GDPR).

What are other democratic states doing or trying to do?

In fact, we do not know of any other democratic state which is using such a system. This would be a first in the world, in the negative sense of the word. As a result, there is a high probability that Mauritius will tumble down in world freedom rankings.

In all the democratic states cited in the consultation paper, the responsibility for moderation and removal of illegal content is or will be vested with the social media platforms (when requested by governments).

In Germany, the Network Enforcement Act has forced platforms such as Facebook to employ many more moderators for the country and the law provides that the data should be stored by the platforms for only up to 10 weeks (no moratorium is provided by the ICTA for Mauritius).
In the UK, Ofcom has been tasked with the regulation of social media and the Chief Executive states on the official website that “We won’t censor the web or social media. Free expression is the lifeblood of the internet and it’s central to our democracy, values and modern society.” and “We won’t be responsible for regulating or moderating individual pieces of online content. The Government’s intention is that online platforms should have appropriate systems and processes in place to protect users; and that Ofcom should take action against them if they fall short. We’ll focus particular attention on tackling the most serious harms, including illegal content and harms affecting children.“
India has recently introduced new Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules which require “significant” social media intermediaries (based on the number of users) to have a local representation with a Chief Compliance Officer, a Nodal Contact Person and a Resident Grievance Officer and the platforms would need to publish regular reports about compliance with a Code of Ethics.
There have also been intense debates in all cases and some parts of legislations proposed had to be reviewed or are still being reviewed with no successful model emerging for the time being. For instance, large sections of the French Loi Avia were deemed anti-constitutional by the Senate and had to be reviewed.

The key take away here is that State agencies in democratic countries are not endowing themselves with any technical capacity to interfere, intercept and remove any content on social media in comparison with the Mauritian ICTA proposal.

I am not an expert in technology but I assume that the mechanism for intercepting, decrypting and re-encrypting social media traffic requires enormous technical capabilities given the enormous amounts of data (photos, videos, livestreams, etc.) generated daily. It is also very much a moving target because nothing can prevent any social media network from changing some implementation details which might make the system ineffective. Anyway, just by using a Virtual Private Network (VPN), anyone can bypass the system.

What are potential alternatives to the proposed amendments?

The last question in the consultation paper asks citizens if they think that local courts of justice should be empowered to “impose sentences (which include banning use of social media) on persons convicted of offences relating to misuse of social media tools”. How far has this been explored?
What other preventive measures have been explored (education, sensitisation, digital literacy, etc.)?
What about using our diplomatic connections at the regional level to enter into negotiation with the social media platforms in order to improve their responsiveness? (eg. AU, SADC)

Conclusion

It is a positive sign that this is at the stage of a public consultation, thus requiring inputs from Mauritian citizens as individuals or groups, hopefully shaping the outcome of the final decision to amend legislation or not. In the same spirit, the next phase of the process should be transparent, that is, it is expected that there be a public report about inputs received and how these inputs are tackled by the ICTA and any other authority involved in the process.

The present proposed amendments do not seem reasonable in terms of the proportionality of the measures with respect to the problem to be tackled and puts Mauritius at risk of becoming a surveillance state with potential abuse and misuse of the technical toolset against its very own citizens, rather than to protect them.

It is thus very important that concerned citizens send their inputs to

Click here to read my final submission to the ITCA in the form of an Analytical Paper

Fake news: comment les repérer?

09/04/2020 By christina Leave a Comment

J’ai récemment donné deux interviews dans la presse sur les ‘fake news’. Voici les questions des journalistes et les réponses originales que j’ai données.

Pour Amy Kamanah (Article paru dans 5 Plus Dimanche le 29 mars 2020)

Comment les repérer? Comment faire la différence entre une vraie et une fausse nouvelle? Vos conseils

Avant de partager quoi que ce soit et donc potentiellement participer à la distribution de fausses nouvelles ou des nouvelles approximatives, il faut se poser plusieurs questions:

Qui est l’auteur original de l’information?
Quelles sont ses motivations pour partager cette information?
Il y a-t-il une logique solide dans le contenu de l’information?
Quelles sont les sources utilisées par l’auteur? Comment ont-elles été obtenues?
L’information suscite-t-elle des émotions fortes? Si oui, c’est souvent un signe qu’il s’agit de sensationnalisme pour vous pousser à partager l’information.
Il y a-t-il d’autres sources différentes et crédibles qui donnent la même information?
Est-ce que les photos soi-disant originales ont déjà été utilisées ailleurs pour un autre sujet ou une date antérieure?

Il faut aussi:

Ne pas se fier uniquement au titre, au résumé et à l’illustration car il peut y avoir décalage avec le contenu détaillé. Certains font du sensationnalisme et du clickbait pour gonfler leur audience.
Lire et relire attentivement tout le contenu. Comprendre le tout dans le détail.
Si l’information cite des sources expertes, chercher les sources scientifiques publiées concernant le sujet et vérifier si ces sources sont vraiment expertes (par exemple leurs publications scientifiques et les articles crédibles qui les citent).
Se méfier si on vous demande de partager sous le prétexte que les autorités/médias/experts nous cachent cette information.
Se méfier si le texte comporte des fautes et beaucoup de majuscules et des points d’exclamation.

Pour Jane Chamroo (Article paru dans Le Défi Quotidien le 3 avril 2020)

Comment faire pour reconnaître les Fake news?

Il faut se poser de multiples questions. Si l’information suscite des émotions, il faut s’en méfier car les ‘fake news’ cherchent surtout à créer de l’émotion et donc l’impulsion de repartager l’information tout de suite. Il faut se demander qui est l’auteur de l’information et quelles sont ses motivations potentielles. Ensuite, il faut lire et relire le contenu pour en comprendre tous les éléments. Il ne faut surtout pas lire uniquement les titres ou les résumés qui peuvent être trompeurs car certains médias les utilisent pour du ‘clickbait’ et cherchent surtout à gonfler leur audience. Il faut aussi se demander quelles sont les sources utilisées pour écrire l’article et comment l’information a été obtenue. Idéalement, on doit également contre-vérifier l’information en la croisant avec d’autres sources et d’autres médias.

Y a t-il des techniques en particulier pour être un fact-checker ?

Oui, nous avions d’ailleurs organisé un atelier de fact-checking avec Africa Fact Check l’an dernier pour une vingtaine de journalistes. Il y a des méthodes et des outils pour vérifier les informations de différents types que ce soit des chiffres, des images ou des vidéos. Par exemple, on peut retracer la source originale d’une photo avec des outils tels que TinEye ou RevEye pour savoir si elle n’est pas juste une reprise d’une vieille photo pour illustrer un pseudo-événement contemporain.

Comment lutter contre les fake news ?

C’est une lutte importante mais très difficile car l’être humain adore partager des informations y compris la rumeur depuis la nuit des temps et les réseaux sociaux ne font qu’amplifier ce phénomène en rendant les choses virales très rapidement. Il faut donc que les plateformes aient un meilleur contrôle de la situation, ce qui est loin d’être le cas aujourd’hui en dépit de leurs efforts en ce sens. Le danger c’est d’aller vers l’autre extrême qui est celui de la censure et du politiquement correct au détriment de la critique intelligente et de l’humour qui sont bien nécessaires dans une société libre. Je crois que la responsabilité doit donc être partagée avec tous les acteurs principaux concernés: les plateformes, les médias producteurs de contenus, les décideurs politiques mais aussi et surtout les citoyens. Il y a un gros travail de ‘media literacy’ à faire. Il faut s’éduquer à une bonne hygiène informationnelle tout comme nous prônons une bonne hygiène alimentaire.

Y a t-il des outils gratuits en ligne pour identifier les Fake News ?

Oui, il y a bon nombre d’organisations qui se spécialisent dans la détection des ‘fake news’. On peut citer par exemple FactCheck.org, AFP Fact Check, PolitiFact, Les Décodeurs du journal Le Monde et Africa Fact Check entra autres.

Quels effets, selon vous, peuvent avoir les Fake news sur la population ? (surtout avec l’hystérie liée au coronavirus)

Les ‘fake news’ peuvent créer de l’angoisse, mener des gens à prendre des décisions irrationnelles, semer la panique, créer de la méfiance voire la violence entre les groupes ou et même déstabiliser une société.

Désintoxication digitale : 72 heures sans Internet

28/04/2015 By christina Leave a Comment

La semaine dernière, le journal Le Défi Quotidien a publié un dossier sur la désintoxication digitale pour lequel le journaliste Kinsley David m’avait posé quelques questions il y a une quinzaine de jours. L’article final est accessible sur le lien suivant:

http://www.defimedia.info/defi-quotidien/dq-societe/item/71590-desintoxication-digitale-72-heures-sans-internet.html

Ci-dessous l’intégralité de mes réponses pour ceux que cela peut intéresser:

1. Pourquoi est-ce aussi difficile aujourd’hui de vivre sans être perpétuellement connecté ? Sommes-nous devenus paresseux ou fainéants ?

La connection internet fait pratiquement partie des besoins primaires dans le monde moderne puisque la plupart de nos informations nous proviennent par ce biais et nous vivons dans la société de l’information. Bientôt, nous ne pourrons pas imaginer vivre sans accès à Internet, tout comme c’est devenu le cas pour l’eau courante, l’électricité, le téléphone, la radio, la télévision, entre autres. Chaque vague et chaque invention technologique et médiatique apporte bien sûr des questionnements, des doutes, des critiques, et il faut donc s’adapter et revoir notre mode de vie de manière saine et raisonnée. En attendant la maturité, beaucoup se laissent entraîner par des tendances extrêmes, des comportements d’addiction, des usages frivoles. Il s’agit simplement pour chacun de trouver l’équilibre qui permette l’utilisation optimale de ces nouvelles technologies tout en préservant des comportements sains et plus bénéfiques à notre corps et à notre intellect.

2. Que s’est-il passé aux moyens traditionnels de communication tels que le courrier, entre autres ? Est-ce une bonne chose de se fier uniquement à la technologie pour communiquer que ce soit dans le contexte professionnel ou familial ? – Impact d’une hyper connexion sur les relations – professionnelles et familiales ?

Les moyens de communication traditionnels continuent à exister et à innover. D’ailleurs la livraison de paquets augmente grâce au commerce électronique. La technologie permet de rendre tout cela plus efficace, plus rapide, plus fluide et surtout avec une excellente traçabilité. Bien sûr, c’est dommage que nous perdions la faculté d’écrire de belles lettres à la main. Mais il faut savoir qu’avec Internet, c’est la démocratisation possible de la communication que ce soit en termes de flux ou de formats.

Il s’agit cependant d’inculquer les bases de la Netiquette à tous. Il y a aussi un travail de ‘media and technology literacy’ à accomplir car tous ne savent pas nécessairement quand et comment communiquer, comment rechercher l’information et l’importance du partage d’information. Il nous faut aussi apprendre à gérer l’interférence de ces technologies sur les relations et interactions non-virtuelles. Par exemple, apprendre à socialiser et savoir converser avec les autres en présence. Cela commence par les parents qui doivent établir, pour les très jeunes, des règles subtiles (et donner eux-mêmes l’exemple) sur l’usage du mobile. Dans beaucoup de familles, ces outils sont devenus des baby-sitters et les parents n’engagent pas la conversation avec leurs enfants. Hier c’était la télévision. Aujourd’hui ce sont le téléphone, la tablette ou la console. L’outil importe peu. C’est à nous de réguler nos propres comportements.

3. Quel est votre avis sur la digital détox ? Êtes-vous d’avis qu’il est important de se déconnecter de temps en temps et de retourner aux sources ? Quel est l’équilibre à maintenir pour ne pas être accros à la technologie ?

La digital detox, c’est bien mais c’est comme les régimes alimentaires. On en fait pour un moment et puis on rechute. Il faut plutôt prendre conscience des comportements, avoir des programmes de ‘media and technology literacy’ à l’école, trouver moyen de faire en sorte que les gens tirent un bénéfice de cette avalanche d’information qui nous est tout à coup accessible pour améliorer notre vivre ensemble. La technologie n’est qu’un outil. C’est à nous de la façonner, de nous l’approprier sainement, de l’utiliser à bon escient et surtout d’être plus créatifs au lieu d’être des consommateurs passifs de contenus uniquement frivoles.